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Fundamental Ideas as a Guiding Category 
in Mathematics Education—Early 
Understandings, Developments in German-
Speaking Countries and Relations to Subject 
Matter Didactics
Andreas Vohns1
Abstract In its day-to-day regime the mathematics classroom is mainly focused on 
students’ mastery of specific knowledge and skills currently at hand. But do they 
see the bigger picture? Do they get an appropriate idea of what mathematics is es-
sentially about? Fundamental ideas have been a regularly proposed way to outline 
the bigger picture. That is, to provide both mathematics educators and students 
with several central themes that interconnect the different areas of mathematics 
and its applications. Such ideas should be able to guide the selection, organization 
and presentation of curriculum content and subsequently make mathematics more 
understandable for students.
This article aims to offer the English-speaking reader an overview of important 
stages in the specific development of the understanding of fundamental ideas within 
the German-speaking community of mathematics education. It embeds this line of 
research within the subject matter didactics tradition that this volume is dedicated to 
and it draws comparisons to and discusses relations between “Grundvorstellungen” 
and fundamental ideas.
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Fundamentale Ideen als Leitkategorie in der Mathematikdidaktik 
- Frühe Zugänge, Entwicklungen im deutschprachigen Raum und 
Querverbindungen zur Stoffdidaktik
Zusammenfassung Das „Alltagsgeschäft“ des Mathematikunterrichts konzentri-
ert sich für gewöhnlich auf die gerade aktuell zu beherrschenden Wissensbestände 
und Fähigkeiten. Aber bekommen die Lernenden auch ein Bild vom Ganzen, eine 
Ahnung davon, worum es bei Mathematik im Kern eigentlich geht? Fundamen-
tale Ideen sind ein verschiedentlich gemachter Vorschlag, ein Bild von Ganzen zu 
skizzieren, indem sowohl Lehrende als auch Lernende mit einigen „roten Fäden“ 
versorgt werden, die verschiedene Bereiche der Mathematik untereinander und mit 
ihren außermathematischen Anwendungen in Zusammenhang stellen. Sie erschein-
en daher geeignet, bei der Auswahl, Organisation und Präsentation mathematischer 
Inhalte für den Unterricht zu orientieren und in der Folge die Mathematik für die 
Lernenden verständlicher zu machen.
Diese Arbeit gibt englischsprachigen Leserinnen und Lesern einen Überblick 
über entscheidende Stadien in der Entwicklung des Verständnisses solcher funda-
mentaler Ideen als didaktischer Kategorie in der deutschsprachigen mathematikdi-
daktischen Diskussion. Sie bettet diese Forschungsrichtung ein in den Kontext der 
im Rahmen dieses Themenhefts fokussierten Stoffdidaktik, zieht Vergleiche zum 
Konzept „Grundvorstellungen“ und stellt Verbindungen her zwischen diesen beiden 
Kategorien.
Schlüsselwörter Fundamentale Ideen · Didaktische Prinzipien ·  
Geschichte der Mathematikdidaktik  · Stoffdidaktik ·  
Mathematikunterricht in den Sekundarstufen
1  Preface
There are at least three key tasks in mathematics education that most mathematics 
educators usually agree upon:
(1) Setting goals for student learning,
(2) Designing and enacting learning experiences for students, and
(3) Assessing student understanding and skills.
In addressing each of those challenges, curriculum designers and teachers generally 
focus on shaping a day-to-day regime of specific knowledge and skills they want 
students to master. But curriculum policy documents usually also articulate some 
fundamental ideas and reasoning processes that make a connection between the dif-
ferent areas of mathematics and its applications. Those interconnecting themes are 
ostensibly used to guide selection, organization and presentation of curriculum con-
tent. However, the effect of such considerations is not always apparent in the content 
of textbooks, tests or the everyday activities of mathematics classrooms.
In the German-speaking community of mathematics educators, the work of identi-
fying and applying fundamental ideas has been (and still is) a common topic closely 
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related to the research area this volume is dedicated to—subject matter didactics 
(“Stoffdidaktik”). Guidance by fundamental ideas has become an inherent part of the 
canon of didactical principles discussed within the German-speaking community, 
which may be credited to a large extent to its inclusion within Wittmann’s widely 
read book Basic Questions of Mathematical Instruction (Wittmann 1974)1, in turn 
owing its inclusion to Bruner’s seminal work The Process of Education (1960, 1977).
When speaking of guidance by fundamental ideas as a didactical principle, we 
must also concede that this principle—while widely spread and continually debated 
within the German-speaking community—has remained rather vague with respect 
to either the question what exactly constitutes a fundamental idea or what kind of 
guidance is to be expected from such a construct. As Jung (1978) stated, some of 
that vagueness may be necessary for fundamental ideas to be consensual among 
mathematics educators, applicable to rather broad areas of mathematical content and 
helpful in achieving the three previously mentioned tasks of mathematics education. 
However, it is also important to acknowledge that the perception of fundamental 
ideas and their didactic objectives are subjected to some important shifts in more 
general perceptions of mathematics education throughout the past 50 years.
Therefore, this article aims to provide the English-speaking reader with an over-
view of the intellectual–historical development of guidance by fundamental ideas as 
a didactical principle within German-speaking countries. For the purpose of better 
illustration, this overview will focus on four distinguishable stages within this devel-
opment. It is also necessary to restrict this overview to the most frequently perceived 
conceptions of fundamental ideas or rather those assumed to be particularly charac-
teristic for the different stages2. The section following this overview is dedicated to 
embedding the discussion of fundamental ideas within the larger context of this vol-
ume, that is subject matter didactics in general and relations to basic mental models 
(“Grundvorstellungen”) as another key concept of this tradition also discussed within 
this volume. The article concludes with an outlook on more recent developments and 
pending issues regarding fundamental ideas as a category for mathematics education 
research and practice.
2  First Stage: Predecessors and Prototypes (Klein and Whitehead)
Linking the didactical principle of guidance by fundamental ideas back to the legacy 
of Felix Klein may in a stricter sense be considered an anachronism. This connection 
is claimed in respect to “educating functional thinking” as a guiding principle of the 
Meran reform, whereas “functional thinking” acts as a prototype of what will later 
on be called a “fundamental idea”. Another connection lies in similarities between 
Meran reform and “New Math” as the background against which Klein and Bruner 
develop their approaches to mathematics education, respectively.
1 In German: Grundfragen des Mathematikunterrichts. Any translations within this article have been made 
by the author unless stated otherwise.
2 As such a judgment is subjected to personal preferences and bias, the reader may be referred to Heymann 
(2003, pp. 108–123) and Schweiger (2005) for other (English language) accounts on the matter at hand.
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Alfred N. Whitehead deliberates about the role of fundamental ideas for math-
ematics as part of a liberal education curriculum. However, his deliberations had no 
immediate effect on the mathematics curricula in German-speaking countries of that 
time. His thoughts about fundamental ideas are included in this paper because they 
are referenced a number of times much later after the discussion of Bruner.
2.1  Felix Klein and the Meran Reform: Educating Functional Thinking as a 
Prototype of a Fundamental Idea
The Meran reform is named after a symposium of the Association of German Natural 
and Medical Scientists in the city of Meran in 1905 and the syllabus that was formu-
lated there. One of the main goals of Felix Klein and the Meran reformists was estab-
lishing “educating functional thinking” as a “special task” of mathematics as part of 
general education in schools3. What the Meran reform shares with “New Math” is 
that both can be considered an effort to close a growing gap between mathematics 
education in schools and mathematics as a research domain. Introducing differential 
calculus in the higher grades of mathematics education at high schools (Gymnasium) 
as an alternative to scientifically outmoded forms of algebraic analysis is the most 
visible and longer lasting consequence in this regard (cf. Biermann and Jahnke 2014).
But “educating functional thinking” was neither conceptually limited to this ele-
ment nor was it limited to the sole goal of scientification. Functional thinking was 
originally understood in a rather broad sense, “relating cognitive processes, math-
ematical concepts and big ideas for general mathematics education” (Biehler and 
Peter-Koop 2008, p. 2). Not only was functional thinking and reasoning considered 
a bridge between mathematics in secondary education and mathematics at the uni-
versity level, but also a unifying concept within school mathematics itself. Concen-
trating mathematics education on such topics, which act as exemplary specifications 
of functional thinking, was also considered a possible solution to the problem of 
“Stoffdruck”—the potential flooding of growingly detailed knowledge potentially 
caused by a simple pledge for “keeping pace” with the ever growing amount of scien-
tific knowledge in mathematics. Within the Meran syllabus of 1905 functional think-
ing was intended to be introduced anticipatorily from the third year of Gymnasium 
onwards (Krüger 2000, p. 170). Both within arithmetic and geometry those anticipa-
tory forms consisted of experimenting with and observing the effects of variations on 
parts of a geometric figure (or arithmetic term) on the figure (or term) as a whole. In 
this regard it can be considered a prototype for what would later on be outlined as one 
central aspect of the “operative principle” (cf. Krüger 2000, pp. 267–274).
Finally, functional thinking was also considered a concept linking mathematics 
and its applications. Throughout the nineteenth century the process of industrializa-
tion had a far-reaching impact on the work place and everyday life for a large part 
of the population. Mechanization of processes as a central feature of these changes 
is closely related to kinematic and functional understanding. Therefore, functional 
thinking could also be considered a way of overcoming mere formal justifications of 
mathematics as a general “school of proper thinking” by emphasizing its actual prag-
3 Fostering spatial ability being the other “special task” mentioned in Gutzmer (1905).
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matic importance in science, economy and society. In this regard, the Meran reform 
coincides and integrates a broader movement of application–orientation, manifested 
e.g. in the integration of “classical topics of physics (e.g. law of falling bodies, trajec-
tory parabola, oscillation of the pendulum)” (Krüger 2000, p. 135).
2.2  Alfred N. Whitehead: Fundamental Ideas and the Role of Mathematics in 
Liberal Education
Alfred N. Whitehead has dealt with the notion of guidance by fundamental ideas in 
at least three of his works: In both his educational essays The Mathematical Cur-
riculum (Whitehead 1913/1967) and The Aims of Education (Whitehead 1916/1967) 
as well as in his first book about mathematics written for a larger public audience An 
Introduction to Mathematics (Whitehead 1911). In the later discussion about funda-
mental ideas in the German-speaking countries The Mathematical Curriculum is fre-
quently chosen as one key reference point besides Bruner, while An Introduction to 
Mathematics has been mentioned only twice and at a relatively late stage4, although 
it presumably contains the clearest indications of what Whitehead thought to be fun-
damental ideas of mathematics.
What Whitehead is concerned with in both of the aforementioned essays is the 
danger of “mathematics, as practiced by the experts, […] becoming isolated from 
other aspects of culture” (Heymann 2003, p. 112) and the notion that mathematics “in 
general opinion […] is the very typical example of reconditeness” (Whitehead 1967, 
p. 78). Whitehead goes on to proclaim the “liability to reconditeness […] the char-
acteristic evil which is apt to destroy the utility of mathematics in liberal education” 
(ibid.). He even admits that mathematics “as it exists in the minds and in the books 
of students of mathematics is recondite. It proceeds by deducing innumerable special 
results from general ideas, each result more recondite than its preceding” (ibid.).
Whitehead claims the importance of distinguishing carefully between mathematics 
as a subject for all (in other words: its role as a subject in general or liberal education) 
and mathematics as a “subject of profound study” (ibid., p. 79, in other words: its role 
as an area of dedicated professional study within tertiary education). For the use of 
mathematics in liberal education, Whitehead proclaims that “a rigorous process of 
selection and adaption” is needed and mathematics instruction should “deal directly 
and simply with a few general ideas of far reaching importance” (ibid., p. 79). He 
argues that for “the purposes of education, mathematics constitutes of the relations 
of number, the relations of quantity, and the relations of space” (ibid., p. 80). How-
ever, Whitehead is well aware that there “is no royal road to learning through an airy 
path of brilliant generalisation” (ibid., p. 6) and “education is a patient process of the 
mastery of details, minute by minute, day by day” (ibid., p. 6). The difficulty in the 
apprehension of general ideas therefore is making “the pupil see the wood by means 
of the trees” (ibid., p. 6), i.e. providing students with convincing practical examples as 
“direct illustrations of the main ideas” (ibid., p. 81) so that they can finally recognize 
“that the preceding years of work have illustrated those relations of number, quantity 
4 In Schweiger (2005) and Schweiger (2010), although Schweiger’s discussion of fundamental ideas dates 
back to Schweiger (1982).
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and space” (ibid. p. 80). He further emphasizes “that theoretical ideas should always 
find important applications within the pupil’s curriculum” (ibid., p. 5).
Whitehead is also concerned about the disconnectedness of school subjects which 
“kills the vitality of our modern curriculum” (ibid., p. 6). Taking the teaching of 
algebra as an example, Whitehead argues that there is no reason to teach e.g. the solu-
tion of quadratic equations unless it fits “a connected curriculum” wherein quadratic 
equations can be understood as a special manifestation of algebra as a more general 
“intellectual instrument which has been created for rendering clear the quantitative 
aspects of the world” (ibid. p. 7). Likewise he argues that “Geometry and Geometri-
cal Drawing must be extended beyond the mere circle of geometrical ideas. In an 
industrial neighbourhood, machinery and workplace practice form the appropriate 
extension” (ibid., p. 10).
Whitehead draws a clear distinction between mathematics as an area of profes-
sional study and mathematics for the purpose of liberal education. Additionally, he 
draws attention to the fact that only such ideas would facilitate mathematics educa-
tion, which give an immediate sense of urge and meaningfulness to students. This 
appears to be somewhat forward-looking when compared to early interpretations of 
Bruner’s calls for “guidance by fundamental ideas” against the background of “New 
Math” about 50 years later.
3  Second Stage: Mathematical Structures as Ideas Guiding Curriculum 
Development against the Background of “New Math” (Jerome S. 
Bruner)
It is next to impossible to write a comprehensive summary of Bruner’s The Process 
of Education and the impact it had either on the “New Math” movement in general 
or on “Neue Mathematik” as its counterpart in Germany and Austria when one can 
only dedicate a few pages to this topic. I consider it essential to acknowledge that 
“guidance by fundamental ideas” does not really evolve as a didactical principle in 
German-speaking countries until two of the most prominent features of early inter-
pretations of Bruner within the “New Math” paradigm are challenged:
 ● Firstly, the assertion that “mathematical structures” which are fruitful and impor-
tant for research in mathematics can automatically act as fundamental ideas guid-
ing the mathematical curriculum and the activities of students from the outset and 
throughout their learning processes.
 ● Secondly, and even more essential, the assumption that mathematics as a science 
has a clear consensus on what those fundamental structures are. Namely, those 
structures emphasized in structural mathematics as they were put forward by the 
Bourbaki group.
For all intents and purposes, the notion of “the importance of structure” was far more 
relevant for the shape and form of “New Math” than the notion of “guidance by 
fundamental ideas”. In The Process of Education both notions are at least deeply 
connected—one could even consider Bruner’s use of the phrases “fundamental idea” 
and “basic structure” as ultimately interchangeable.
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The most commonly cited excerption from The Process of Education is likely its 
“bold hypothesis” that “any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually 
honest form to any child at any stage of development” (Bruner 1977, p. 33). This 
hypothesis is grounded upon Bruner’s strong belief “that intellectual activity any-
where is the same, whether at the frontier of knowledge or in a third-grade classroom. 
What a scientist does at his desk or in his laboratory […] are of the same order as 
what anybody else does when he is engaged in like activities—if he is to achieve 
understanding. The difference is in degree, not in kind.” (ibid., p. 14). Bruner was 
convinced “that the academic disciplines or topics have a tendency to arouse curiosity 
in human beings in general, including children” and therefore opposed the view that 
educators should “make subjects or topics more accessible or palatable by presenting 
them in real-life settings of children’s daily experience. Instead, subjects and topics 
must be presented according to the structures of the academic disciplines which are 
the essence and reflection of accumulated human curiosity” (Takaya 2008, p. 7).
Bruner gives four arguments for the importance of structure for the learning 
process:
1. Understanding the “fundamentals makes a subject more comprehensible” (Bruner 
1977, p. 23) as otherwise presumably special and isolated phenomena can now be 
understood as special cases of a more general phenomenon.
2. Unless detailed knowledge “is placed into a structured pattern, it is rapidly forgot-
ten” (ibid., p. 24).
3. Fundamental ideas and principles are a necessity for “transfer of training” because 
to “understand something as a specific instance of a more general case […] is to 
have learned not only a specific thing but also a model for understanding other 
things like it that one may encounter” (ibid., p. 25).
4. Through emphasizing fundamental structures and principles “one is able to nar-
row the gap between ‘advanced’ knowledge and ‘elementary’ knowledge” (ibid., 
p. 26).
While elaborating on the importance of structure for the learning of a subject Bruner 
also speaks of “basic ideas that lie at the heart of all science and mathematics” (ibid., 
p. 12), “mastery of the fundamental ideas of a field” (ibid., p. 20), “understanding of 
the fundamental structure of whatever subjects we choose to teach” (ibid., p. 11), and 
“designing curricula in a way that reflects the basic structure of a field of knowledge” 
(ibid., p. 32). The inconsistent use of either one of the adjectives “basic” or “funda-
mental” as well as either one of the terms “idea” or “structure” makes it doubtful that 
Bruner intended to define a new concept “fundamental idea”.
Bruner does not fail to mention the importance of intuition and discovery learning 
in acquiring fundamental ideas, structures and principles of a subject. His famous 
“spiral curriculum” calls for “an emphasis upon the intuitive grasp of ideas” in early 
learning and for revisiting these ideas “repeatedly, building upon them until the stu-
dent has grasped the full formal apparatus that goes with them.” (ibid., p. 13). While 
this “spiral curriculum” advocates research into ways of teaching that allow for such 
an intuitive grasp of fundamental ideas and principles, the connection between math-
ematics learning in schools and mathematics as a research domain is otherwise a 
rather direct one: What ideas, principles and structures are to be regarded “fundamen-
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tal” is a question that according to Bruner is up to the “most able scholars and scien-
tists” (ibid., p. 19) to decide reflecting their own scientific practice in mathematics.
Against the backdrop of “New Math” the answers given consisted of fundamental 
concepts and principles derived more or less directly from the hierarchy of logical 
structures of pure modern mathematics along the lines of Bourbaki, e.g. “basic con-
ceptions such as composition/order/topology or set/structure/mapping” (Tietze 1994, 
p. 48). The Bourbaki group had been rather successful in showing that “concepts and 
principles of the major branches of mathematics can, in some sense, be derived logi-
cally from a small set of primitive assumptions and structures” (Fey 1994, p. 17). If 
one is convinced that mathematical knowledge is “structured in an optimum way in 
the modern sciences” (Heymann 2003, p. 114) one is easily led to the conclusion that 
the “primary task of schooling is to transform the ‘structure of the disciplines’ into 
the cognitive structure of the learner” (ibid.). It is also important to take into account 
that “the process of education” is not restricted to examples from mathematics but 
rather discusses the importance of structure based on examples from both sciences 
and humanities, where ‘structure’ does not per se refer to an equally specific denota-
tion as it does in structural mathematics. It is therefore questionable whether Bruner 
himself intended such a narrow interpretation.
4  Third Stage: Overcoming “New Math” through Genuinely 
Researching Fundamental Ideas (Schreiber, Schweiger, Tietze and 
Others)
If one takes “New Math” and its emphasis on logical structures in school mathemat-
ics for a realization of Bruner’s notion of “guidance by fundamental ideas”, there is 
little doubt that with hindsight this realization can be regarded a failure.
What was contested early in the discussion was the identification of fundamental 
ideas with “basic structures” along the lines of Bourbaki. For example, Freudenthal 
strongly opposed identifying basic conceptions such as set, structure and mapping 
with fundamental ideas for mathematics in school. He argues that the original mean-
ing of such “structures of a discipline” merely consists of codifying “systematically 
(and in the case of mathematics this means deductively) the state of that science at 
a given moment and, for that matter, of a science that is not even the subject of the 
instruction envisaged” (Freudenthal 2002, p. 28). Such a purpose requires a hierarchy 
of structures “from poorer to richer” (ibid.) which Freudenthal deemed potentially 
harmful when imitated within curriculum design:
Poor structures are utterly abstract as is evident from the poorest of all, the 
structure-less set. Didactically one cannot come to grips with it, or it should be 
by concretising, by filling out the abstract form, and in practice this is done by 
creating artificial, and often even false concretisations. In genuine mathemat-
ics, sets as well as all of these structures serve goals; they are because they are 
operational. At the level where science structure curricula start, however, there 
is nothing mathematical one can do with sets. So, as a curriculum designer, one 
arbitrarily invents things to do with sets, which have nothing to do with the 
need for sets in mathematics (Freudenthal 2002, pp. 28/29).
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Wittenberg (1963, p. 55) voiced equal criticism towards the use of the terminology 
of structural modern mathematics denouncing it a mere “aping” of a language whose 
peculiarities cannot be valued when applied to the rather restricted range of math-
ematical topics one can usually cover in school. Fischer (1985, p. 62) argues in the 
same vein as Freudenthal: Basic structures along the lines of Bourbaki serve specific 
functions in university mathematics. When simply appending such conceptions to 
school mathematics they tend to lose their meaningfulness and social-communica-
tive character. Both Lenné (1969) and Damerow (1977) did extensive research into 
the influence “New Math” had on mathematics education in Germany. Lenné (1969, 
pp. 95–103) already noted that the realization of “New Math” within the Nurem-
burg syllabus of 1965 did not deliver on the promise of rethinking, reducing and 
restructuring the increasingly overwhelming amount of mathematical subject matter 
potentially to be taught in school. On the contrary, he found that emphasizing the 
“structure of the discipline” more often than not meant the inclusion and addition of 
new concepts and with them new contexts and topics, in which those concepts could 
prove themselves useful, as they had little to no meaning in more traditional topics. 
Analysing the Standing Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs’ 
1968 curriculum framework, Damerow (1977, pp. 225 f) found that the newly intro-
duced and rather abstract concepts were often included within topics that did not 
provide a sound basis and lacked meaningful applications. This repeatedly resulted in 
a mishmash of traditional approaches and modern approaches with some concessions 
regarding age appropriateness.
I consider the generally accepted failure of “New Math” the necessary turning 
point for the formulation of fundamental ideas as a genuine research problem of 
subject matter didactics. In acknowledging that mathematicians had no consensus 
on “fundamental ideas” appropriate for curriculum design, identifying such ideas 
became a genuine research goal of subject matter didactics. The years between the 
early 1970s and the late 1980s are the formative years for this research problem. 
Within this timeframe three essential conceptions of “fundamental ideas” and their 
role in curriculum design and classroom practice are worked out partly independent 
of each other while unified by both recalling Bruner’s views on the role of funda-
mental ideas and by rejecting or modifying earlier interpretations of Bruner at least 
in some respect. The crucial lesson learned from the failure of “New Math” within 
these conceptions was beginning to embrace Thom’s stance that “whether one wishes 
it or not, all mathematical pedagogy, even if scarcely coherent, rests on a philosophy 
of mathematics” (Thom 1973, p. 204), i.e. those conceptions are incrementally taking 
better account of and concerning themselves with genuinely didactical categoriza-
tions as a perquisite for identifying fundamental ideas.
4.1  Universal and Central Ideas (Schreiber)
Alfred Schreiber’s conception of universal and central ideas already defines itself in 
rejecting the proposed designation “fundamental ideas”. He finds such a designation 
misleading since it evokes a sense of “fundamentalism”. But the mathematical ideas 
he is concerned with are in no way related to questions about “fundamentals” along 
the lines of the Bourbaki group and their involvement with the foundations of math-
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ematics. Schreiber follows Freudenthal in arguing that universal ideas should not 
focus on mathematics as a finished product but rather on mathematical processes and/
or processes of mathematization. He thinks of universal ideas as general schemes, 
which are used in such processes “which set these processes into motion and keep 
them going” (Schreiber 1979, p. 166). If we cast our minds back to Bruner’s claim of 
the equivalence of activities both students and researchers at their respective “fron-
tiers” partake in, we might argue that by emphasizing processual aspects of (yet) 
unfinished mathematics Schreiber tries to correct one of the misunderstandings of 
“New Math” and more directly relates to Bruner’s initial intentions.
Universal ideas according to Schreiber should also help to discover the arche-
typical and pretheoretical roots of mathematical concepts and procedures within the 
realm of common sense. In this regard he sees a considerable need for research as he 
deems forgetting and/or eliminating any traces of common sense reasoning within 
mathematics as something the science itself generally favors (cf. Schreiber 1983, 
p. 67). While within “New Math” the main justification for reorganizing the cur-
riculum according to “fundamental ideas” or “the structure of the discipline” was the 
importance these ideas and structures had within mathematics as a scientific domain 
and may therefore be summarized as “legitimization through scientification”. Sch-
reiber rejects such a narrow focus and directly refers to Whiteheads argumentation: 
Universal ideas should be “universal” in the sense that they should have a broad 
importance for everyday life and also help to provide a better understanding of math-
ematics in the context of scientific activities in general (cf. ibid. p. 67).
Schreiber (1979) proposes algorithm, exhaustion, optimality, function, charac-
terization as potential candidates for universal ideas. In Schreiber (1983) his (pro-
visional) catalogue of ideas has already grown to a number of 15 ideas grouped 
within three categories: procedures (exhaustion, iteration, reduction, transformation/
mapping and algorithm), properties (quantity, continuity, optimality, invariance and 
infiniteness) and components of concept formation processes (ideation, abstraction, 
representation, space and unit). Schreiber (1983) also specifies three criteria for the 
“universality” of the ideas in question:
1. Width (logical generality),
2. Richness (broad applicability and relevance in different areas of mathematics)
3. Sense (anchoring within the realm of common sense, relevance and meaning in 
real life situations) (Schreiber 1983, p. 69).
Schreiber is well aware that both this conceptualization of universality and his cata-
logue of universal ideas imply concepts and procedures of a rather general nature. 
He is therefore very careful in stating that these universal ideas are primarily to be 
considered components of meta-knowledge aimed at mathematics teachers and cur-
riculum designers, not to be confused with mathematical content directly aimed at 
students.
Additionally, Schreiber (1979, p. 167) already mentions the idea of identifying 
central ideas as less general embodiments of universal ideas specific to particular 
areas of mathematics. In fact, he regards the identification of area-specific central 
ideas as one of five key issues where further research about universal ideas is nec-
essary. Central ideas and their relation to universal ideas is a topic further elabo-
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rated upon in Bender and Schreiber (1985)5 regarding geometry as an example. The 
predominant role of central ideas for learning mathematics is stressed here, i.e. the 
authors are claiming that “learners may reach an understanding of universal ideas 
first and foremost through reaching an understanding of central ideas (of specific 
areas of mathematics)” (Bender and Schreiber 1985, pp. 199/200). Bender and Sch-
reiber (1985) discuss rigid body, homogeneity, measurement and fitting of forms as 
central ideas more specific to geometry while also discussing the importance of more 
universal ideas such as exhaustion and optimization. Within the framework of opera-
tive concept formation Bender and Schreiber (1985) conceive the didactical principle 
of guidance by universal and central ideas in close relation to other didactical princi-
ples such as the genetic principle (mathematical courses should take into account and 
integrate aspects of both the psychological development of children and the histori-
cal development of mathematics), the teleological principle (mathematical courses 
should explicitly be aimed at specific goals namely such goals which give learners a 
sense of purpose and meaning) and the principle of pragmatic ordering (each step in 
a course has to be taken at an appropriate point, i.e. nothing precedes it or is taken for 
granted, which can only be achieved by taking this step).
While Schreiber (1979, p. 167) included research into the use of universal and cen-
tral ideas in classroom practice as another key issue of further research, his consider-
ations never quite reached that level of concrete implementation let alone systematic 
empirical study. Moreover, it is well justified to consider Bender & Schreiber’s 
Operative Genese der Geometrie (transl. to: Operative Genesis of Geometry) (1985) 
a more pronounced example of research into the consequence of guidance by funda-
mental ideas for curricular design, but for a large part the book remains on a concep-
tual level as far as actual classroom practice is concerned. Additionally, both Bender 
and Schreiber (1980) and Bender and Schreiber (1985) contain some example les-
sons at least partly held by the authors. These lessons tend to illustrate the more 
comprehensive principle of operative concept formation, not the principle of guid-
ance by universal or central ideas by itself. However, operative concept formation is 
both limited to geometry in scope and explicitly rests on a very specific philosophy 
of mathematics, namely Hugo Dingler’s operationism6, which has not been adopted 
widely within mathematics education research7.
Schreiber republished his collected works on concept formation in 2011, including 
his papers on universal and central ideas along with a rather disenchanting postscript 
on this topic. He concludes that there is little to no effect of didactical considerations 
about fundamental ideas on actual classroom practice as of yet. He argues that nowa-
days neither educational zeitgeist nor prevalent practical problems of teachers would 
leave much room to contemplate about fundamental ideas of mathematics. He also 
admits that his initial hopes regarding central or universal ideas acting as an agent of 
concept formation were widely disappointed, retrospectively. In closing he suggests 
5 Following Bender (1978) and Bender (1983); for an English language overview see also Bender and 
Schreiber (1980).
6 For a brief overview of Dingler’s philosophy see cf. Wolters (1988).
7 Schreiber (2011, p. 153) also admits his own attempts at resting geometry instruction upon this philoso-
phy proved rather difficult and were of limited success at best.
S204 A. Vohns
1 3
it may be more helpful to think of fundamental ideas as ex post heuristics of concept 
formation, which learners should not be confronted with until a certain amount of 
knowledge has been achieved and may serve as a basis for meaningful retrospection 
(cf. Schreiber 2011, pp. 91/92).
4.2  Fundamental Ideas (Schweiger)
Fritz Schweiger developed another conception of fundamental ideas roughly at the 
same time as Schreiber. While retrospectively it may be considered an extension or 
modification of Schreiber’s conception (especially regarding the list of criteria for 
identifying such ideas), by his own account Schweiger wrote his first article on fun-
damental ideas (Schweiger 1982) largely unaware of Schreiber’s work. In Schweiger 
(1992) he cites Bruner (1960), Fischer (1976) and Freudenthal (1973) as his initial 
sources of inspiration. Schweiger (1992) on the other hand gives the first compre-
hensive survey on the current state of research and the development of fundamental 
ideas as a field of mathematics education research, also marking the pivotal point of 
theoretical discussion on this topic at least within this phase of the discussion.
The core and most influential part of Schweiger’s conception of fundamental ideas 
is its catalogue of criteria for identifying fundamental ideas rather than its collec-
tion of proposed fundamental ideas. The latter again proclaimed solely prospective 
and therefore ever changing and growing, the former remaining largely unchanged 
up until Schweiger (2005). Schweiger (by his own account preliminarily) defines a 
fundamental idea as follows:
A fundamental idea is a bundle of actions, strategies and techniques, which
(1) can be identified within the historical development of mathematics,
(2) appears viable in structuring curricular designs vertically,
(3) is deemed appropriate in both getting an idea of what mathematics is about and 
fostering conversations about mathematics,
(4) helps making mathematics instruction both more flexible and more accessible,
(5) has a corresponding linguistic or operational archetype within the realm of every-
day language and activities. (Schweiger 1992, p. 207)
While criterion (5) directly mirrors the “sense” criterion proposed by Schreiber, both 
conceptions differ regarding the conceptualization of the broadness of a mathemati-
cal idea that is to be considered universal or fundamental. Schweiger’s definition 
does neither explicitly require the “width” (logical universality) nor the “richness” 
(transcending the borders of traditional branches of mathematics) of Schreiber’s uni-
versal ideas. Schweiger draws more attention to the diachronic, vertical dimension in 
requiring fundamental ideas to both recur in the historical development of mathemat-
ics (1) and on different levels of the mathematical curriculum (2). Compared to Sch-
reiber’s criteria, criteria (1) to (3) of Schweiger (1992) are formulated more directly 
bearing in mind the potential didactical functions of fundamental ideas. Schwill 
(1993) explicitly regards them as normative criteria, a view adopted in Schweiger 
(2005). Schweiger’s catalogue of criteria may lack Schreiber’s “width” criterion, but 
the fundamental ideas he proposes are not less general per se—his earliest catalogue, 
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e.g. consists of linearization, bifurcation, similarity, stability, independence of inter-
ferences, canonical forms, typical behaviour and the power of formalization.
Schweiger’s criteria for identifying fundamental ideas have been widely recog-
nized and adopted (with some specific omissions, additions and modifications), e.g. by 
Schupp (1984), Humenberger and Reichel (1995), Führer (1997) and Peschek (2005). 
Schwill (1993) is a special case regarding the explicit integration of Schreiber’s “rich-
ness” criterion [“fundamental ideas recur in different parts of mathematics (horizontal 
dimension)”], a differentiation between descriptive and normative criteria as well as 
to the effect of applying fundamental ideas to informatics education rather than math-
ematics education. Schwill (1993) also subdivides Schweiger’s criterion (2) into a 
descriptive part [“fundamental ideas recur at different levels (vertical dimensions)”] 
and a normative part [“fundamental ideas should help to design curricula”].
Schweiger does not differentiate distinct levels of fundamental ideas similar to 
Schreiber’s distinction between universal and central ideas. However, Schweiger 
(1992) includes the notion of a hierarchy of fundamental ideas which may be sum-
marized as follows: All sciences develop and share some universal ideas in gen-
eral which may be interpreted as a continuation of everyday activities and thinking. 
Each science also has some characteristic ideas separating one from another. Accord-
ingly, each specific area of mathematics both shares some ideas with every other 
area of mathematics and has some ideas characteristic for itself. All of these ideas 
are potentially relevant as fundamental ideas for mathematics instruction. Therefore, 
educational research should try to construct semantic nets between these ideas and 
to design curricula which help students to achieve a continually broadening under-
standing of more and more universal ideas. However, he is well aware that such an 
undertaking might at the lowest level result in catalogues so broad and close meshed 
they simply duplicate “the table of contents of any relevant textbook” (ibid., p. 209).
While both Schweiger (1982) and Schreiber (1983) embraced the idea of devel-
oping a canon of fundamental ideas as a key issue of research into fundamental 
ideas, Schweiger (1992) already considers the goal of canonization unattainable, at 
least as far as mathematics as a whole is concerned. Thus, it is hardly surprising 
that research regarding fundamental ideas during the third stage shifted considerably 
towards research regarding central ideas of specific areas of (school) mathematics 
and to research regarding specific ideas prospectively assumed fundamental, i.e. to 
such lines of research, where either a consensus was easier to achieve or the lack of 
consensus easier to tolerate because questions about the essence or nature of math-
ematics in general could partially be set aside.
4.3  Central Concepts, Subject-Specific Strategies and Patterns of 
Mathematization (Tietze, Klika & Wolpers)
The third influential conception of fundamental ideas was originally developed by 
Tietze (1979) and it takes a more pragmatic and inductive approach to fundamental 
ideas. The publication Tietze (1979) is devoted to fundamental ideas of linear algebra 
and analytic geometry, while in Tietze et al. (1982) he and his co-authors extend their 
conception to mathematics instruction in the upper secondary school years in general.
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The core of this conception is a distinction between three different types of fun-
damental ideas: central concepts, subject-specific strategies and patterns of math-
ematization. To put central concepts of scientific mathematics on the same level as 
fundamental ideas was a rather risky undertaking regarding the generally accepted 
failure of new math in this regard. Tietze et al. (1997, p. 47) are therefore keen to 
emphasize that only such concepts should be assumed fundamental, which “retain 
their value of organizing a broad range of phenomena within school mathematics and 
therefore can inspire mathematics instruction”. Tietze (1994, p. 49) also stresses that 
“central concepts of a subject matter depend on the perspective from which one looks 
at it. If one takes Bourbaki’s perspective on linear algebra, then vector space, linear 
mapping, scalar product, and Steinitz exchange theorem are central. If one looks at it 
from the angle of ‘linear algebra and its applications’ then linear equation and Gauss-
ian algorithm are fundamental”.
What is not contested here, is that central concepts of a developed science may act 
as fundamental ideas for mathematics teaching and learning—a prerequisite neither 
Freudenthal nor Schreiber took for granted drawing more attention to the process 
of mathematization. This processual aspect is on the other hand embraced within 
Tietze, Klika & Wolper’s conception by including subject-specific strategies as more 
informal “strategies of problem solving or strategies of proving, identifying connec-
tions and concept formation in particular” (Tietze et al. 1997, p. 41). Similarly, the 
inclusion of patterns of mathematization may be understood as a countermeasure to 
early interpretations of fundamental ideas which tended to reduce them to the basic 
structures of pure mathematics, whereas patterns of mathematization refer to applied 
mathematics or applications of mathematics in general.
Both the distinction of central concepts, subject-specific strategies and patterns 
of mathematization and the attempt to identify fundamental ideas of mathematics 
inductively by starting with the ideas of specific areas of mathematics may be seen 
as a double-edged sword: Tietze (1994) both justifies the distinction and the induc-
tive approach with the otherwise too general nature and the lack of influence that 
universal ideas along the lines of Schreiber have on mathematical instruction. In 
return, Tietze, Klika & Wolpers diverge from the notion of set of a few fundamental 
ideas that lie at the heart of all mathematics, especially by including central concepts 
of mathematical topics. In fact, it is no exaggeration to state that the catalogue of 
ideas Tietze et al. (1982) compiled shares a very close resemblance with the table 
of contents of any (good) textbook. It is also up for debate whether including cen-
tral concepts by themselves as fundamental ideas does any service to this construct. 
Schweiger (1992) argues that for a concept to be central or act as an idea it almost 
inevitably has to either act as a subject-specific strategy or as an important pattern 
of mathematization or even both. Otherwise, there is little specific guidance such a 
concept can have for mathematics instruction apart from covering the concept itself.
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5  Fourth Stage: Fundamental Ideas, Mathematical Literacy and 
General Education (Heymann, PISA, National Educational 
Standards)
Admitting the need for research into the subject matter to identify fundamental ideas 
and admitting that what is considered a fundamental idea depends on the perception 
of what is essential in mathematics (an implicit or explicit philosophy of mathemat-
ics) was proclaimed the major shift from the second to the third phase of the discus-
sion about fundamental ideas. This aspect continues to gain significance in the fourth 
phase of this development and it takes a specific spin regarding the perception of 
what is essential in mathematics as far as mathematics instruction is concerned. In 
this phase the question what mathematical ideas should be considered fundamental 
for mathematics instruction is explicitly related to larger frameworks of mathemat-
ics education, especially the long-standing German tradition of general education as 
reinterpreted by Heymann (1996, 2003) and the debate about mathematical literacy 
along the lines of the PISA framework. It will also be of interest that by including 
leading ideas into the newly introduced National Educational Standards for Math-
ematics in Grades 5–10 (KMK 2004) some kind of consensus on canonical funda-
mental ideas has been reached by decree and what repercussions this implies.
5.1  Main Ideas and Cultural Competence Within Heymann’s Framework for 
General Education
Heymann’s book Allgemeinbildung und Mathematikunterricht (1996)8 led to an 
intense debate on the future of mathematics instruction. Its goals and relevance for 
society, which was somewhat intensified by the coinciding publication of the results 
of the TIMS Study, generally deemed unsatisfactory regarding the performance of 
German students and therefore another reason to scrutinize the current state of affairs 
in mathematics instruction. While Heymann’s approach is rooted in the long-standing 
tradition of general education (“Bildung”) within humanistic pedagogy9, he sets out 
to establish a more pragmatic understanding of this rather broad, sometimes rather 
emphatic category by clarifying “the idea of general education as a basic education 
for all members of a society and to concretize this idea with respect to teaching 
practice” (Heymann 2003, p. 3). He considers such a broader frame of reference 
increasingly important for mathematics education because “conventional mathemat-
ics instruction in schools does justice neither to foreseeable societal demands nor to 
the individual needs and qualification interests of a majority of adolescents” (ibid., 
p. 2), both of which are traditional objectives of general education.
The core of Heymann’s framework of general education consists of “seven dis-
tinguishable, interconnected objectives of a school system aiming at general educa-
tion” (ibid., p. 5) which are then applied to mathematics as a subject in school by 
8 An abridged English edition was published in 2003 as Why teach Mathematics? A Focus on General 
Education.




identifying “deficits of the current widespread form of mathematics instruction and 
to determine which innovations […] are necessary in order to do more justice to the 
claim of realizing general education” (ibid.). To this end, “guidance by fundamental 
ideas” is one of the “existing concepts of mathematics teaching” Heymann assesses 
anew and modifies “in the light of the idea of general education and personal devel-
opment” (ibid.) in a chapter dedicated to the objective “cultural competence” (ibid., 
pp. 105–130).
I have to confine myself to a very brief summary of what cultural competence is 
about according to Heymann, who summarizes the objective as follows:
Schools should enable adolescents to attain a reflective cultural identity:
to experience themselves as part of the culture in which they grow to maturity 
–with its favourable and unfavourable aspects;
to recognize common elements within their own culture, apart from its break-
down into disparate subcultures;
to accept the otherness of foreign cultures as an equally justified form of human 
existence. (ibid., p. 30).
Heymann considers the traditional subdivision of education into different school 
subjects with their close relations to corresponding scientific disciplines ambivalent 
as far as the objective of cultural competence is concerned. It may be justifiable to 
“legitimize subjects taught at school and, as far as such an affiliation is postulated, 
the corresponding academic disciplines as avenues of access to the cultural diversity 
of the world around us”. However, such arguments are prone to “promote a special-
ist one-sidedness”, i.e. “the detached coexistence of various individual subjects does 
not produce cultural competence” (ibid., pp. 33/34). As a countermeasure Heymann 
proposes main ideas “which can be used to bridge the gap between the subject and 
the culture external to it, which clearly demonstrate what significance the subject (or 
the corresponding academic discipline) has for cultural development, how it is inter-
woven with such development, and how it is connected to everyday life in society” 
(ibid.).
Once Heymann turns to the subject of mathematics instruction in particular, the 
notion of orienting to main ideas becomes his main topic in conceptualizing cultural 
competence. When assessing the discussion about fundamental ideas in mathematics 
education, he goes into greater detail regarding the conceptions of Whitehead and 
Bruner, while more recent conceptions from the German-speaking community are 
only briefly discussed in the context of a synopsis of catalogues of fundamental ideas 
he uses as a sort of “excavation site” (ibid., p 120) for his own catalogue. Heymann 
also chooses some unique points of reference not usually mentioned in other con-
ceptions of fundamental ideas, i.e. he draws much inspiration from Bishop’s (1988) 
approach to transcultural basic mathematical activities and also dedicates a section to 
Wittenberg’s (1963) fundamental intellectual experiences.
Setting aside specific differences and priorities, Heymann (2003, p. 118) gathers 
three objectives that are mutually agreed upon among different proponents of funda-
mental ideas:
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(1) overcoming the dissolution of mathematics education “into a simple collection of 
separate, individual activities and topics” and helping students to “assign a more 
generalized meaning to their activities in the mathematics classroom”;
(2) fostering the acquisition of “an appropriate image of mathematics” through rec-
ognizing the “structure of the discipline” as a means for interconnecting “often 
isolated individual topics” and “clarifying the specific characteristics of the disci-
pline and illuminating the distinctive features of mathematical thought”;
(3) allowing “the learners to perceive how the mathematics taught in school is con-
nected to their other experiences of the world and to their own thinking”, in con-
trast to (2) not so much emphasizing “the ‘distinctive features’ of mathematics, 
but […] its meaning and function for recognizing and forming the world around 
us” and “how mathematics is also relevant outside the scope of mathematical 
specialization”.
Heymann goes on to assert objective (3) to be “especially significant” in promot-
ing cultural competence. This objective played a prominent role in both the Meran 
reform and Whiteheads considerations, was largely absent within the “New Math” 
interpretation of Bruner and then again more prominently present in the concepts of 
the third stage of development discussed above. It is worth noting that the predomi-
nant role Heymann assesses in this regard is a departure from earlier conceptions. In 
fact, Heymann ends up with a catalogue of considerably fewer general ideas (number, 
measuring, structuring space, functional relationship, algorithm, mathematical mod-
elling) when compared to those of Schreiber and Schweiger. The prevailing focus 
on ideas which designate “interfaces between mathematics and culture as a whole” 
(ibid., p. 109) also becomes immediately apparent. That is not to say that Heymann 
sees objective (3) as the sole criterion for identifying main ideas. Regarding his cata-
logue he proclaims that each idea he chose had to be included in at least one of the 
earlier catalogues, should be present at different levels of doing mathematics and 
none of them should “exclusively represent a particular mathematical topic” (ibid., 
p. 123). But the objective of orienting mathematics towards these ideas is promot-
ing cultural competence and apart from algorithm the descriptions of his main ideas 
strongly emphasize real-world applications and interconnections with the culture sur-
rounding mathematics. While none of his ideas may strictly represent only a single 
mathematical topic, many of the ideas he mentions relate predominantly to specific 
traditional strands of school mathematics (number: arithmetic; measurement & struc-
turing space: geometry; functional reasoning: algebra and functions). To this respect 
one might argue that Heymann’s account of main ideas is an attempt to establish a 
more pragmatic understanding of fundamental ideas both in scope (in downplaying 
the role of the “structure of the discipline” or mathematics as a scientific discipline 
in general) and in focus (in more directly linking fundamental ideas to the purpose of 
connecting mathematics to everyday life and therefore making them more immedi-
ately useful for students).
S210 A. Vohns
1 3
5.2  Big Ideas and Leading Ideas: From PISA to the Introduction of National 
Educational Standards for Mathematics in Germany
Another potential way to describe the fourth stage’s new spin in the perception of fun-
damental ideas can be achieved by using a distinction proposed by Prediger (2014): 
While at the second and third phase fundamental ideas often focus on mathematical 
concepts, procedures and activities themselves, conceptions at the fourth stage of this 
development tend to focus on “perspectives of the discipline on reality” (Prediger 
2014, p. 388) mathematics provides, therefore conceptualizing fundamental ideas as 
“interfaces between mathematics and reality” (ibid., p. 387). This is not only true for 
Heymann but even more so for both the big (or overarching) ideas within the PISA 
framework and the leading ideas as used within the National Educational Standards 
for Mathematics in Grades 5–10 introduced in 2003 (KMK 2004).
Both PISA and educational standards are first and foremost frameworks for assess-
ing student knowledge and/or competencies, which is a rather big departure from use 
cases of fundamental ideas up until this point, i.e. other conceptions were focussed 
on the input side of educational processes (designing curricular processes) rather 
than its output side (assessing outcomes of such processes). This change of focus has 
some important repercussions on the conception of fundamental ideas and their role 
in mathematics instruction.
Firstly, mathematical literacy defined as “the capacity to identify, to understand, 
and to engage in mathematics and make well-founded judgements about the role that 
mathematics plays, as needed for an individual’s current and future private life, occu-
pational life, social life with peers and relatives, and life as a constructive, concerned, 
and reflective citizen” (OECD 2000, p. 50) even more clearly as Heymann’s frame-
work in general or his thoughts about cultural competence in particular is confined 
to mathematics instruction providing a set of relevant perspectives on reality. This is 
also apparent if one looks at the set of four big ideas itself:
 ● space and shape,
 ● change and relationships,
 ● quantity,
 ● uncertainty.
This aspect is further emphasized when these big ideas are introduced as an alter-
native to the traditional way of subdividing school mathematics into different 
well-established content strands (arithmetic, geometry, algebra, calculus etc.). One 
argument given for choosing this alternative is that to stay “relevant mathematics 
must reflect the complex patterns in the world around us” (ibid., p. 53). The four big 
ideas are then defined as distinguishable areas of phenomena, in which mathematics 
helps to observe and study such complex patterns.
Secondly, in establishing big ideas as an alternative for curricular strands the PISA 
framework to some extent downplays the importance of interconnectedness both of 
different ideas with each other and of different topics related to one idea across dif-
ferent content strands. When compared to established content strands, these big ideas 
may lead to somewhat different partitions of the mathematical curriculum. But in 
the end there can be little doubt that the big ideas are designations for such parti-
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tions. This is admitted partially in stating that a selection of ideas was chosen, which 
“offers sufficient variety and depth to reveal the essentials of mathematics and […] 
relates to the traditional curricular strands” (ibid., p. 53). The PISA 2003 framework 
renames “big ideas” to “overarching ideas” and even more modestly states that with 
the (unchanged) set of four ideas “mathematical content is organized in a sufficient 
number of areas to ensure spread across the curriculum, but at the same time a num-
ber small enough to avoid a too fine division” (OECD 2003, p. 35). Interestingly 
enough, the PISA 2012 framework while choosing the same four content areas and 
providing the same overall rationale for doing so, has done away with the designation 
“big ideas” or “overarching ideas” altogether, simply speaking of four “broad areas 
of content” (OECD 2013, p. 32).
Within the German-speaking community of mathematics education research the 
big ideas of PISA were initially not considered as a part of the tradition of fundamental 
ideas along the lines of Bruner and the ongoing discussion within German-speaking 
countries—as a matter of fact, the different versions of the international PISA frame-
work do not refer to Bruner or any other conception of fundamental ideas discussed 
above. The German PISA Mathematics Expert Group explicitly draws a distinction 
between fundamental ideas as “relatively general mathematical ways of thinking 
[.] as means for grouping content” and big ideas predominantly designating “con-
nections to contextually defined areas of phenomena” (Neubrand et al. 2001, p. 11). 
Again, it is not contested that these big ideas are ultimately a functional equivalent to 
traditional strands of curricula, but it is argued that the particular big ideas chosen in 
PISA would at least call for some rethinking of curricular priorities in Germany, e.g. 
regarding the minor role of spatial geometry within the traditional curriculum. Winter 
(n. d.) argues that “big ideas” in PISA “to my account are not fundamental ideas, they 
rather designate fields of activity […], or better yet, regions of sources for mathemati-
cal activities”. Then again, Baptist and Winter (2001, pp. 59/60) argue strongly in 
favour of the understanding of “big ideas” within the PISA framework as a means for 
selecting content related goals appropriate for general education.
When the German National Educational Standards for Mathematics in Grades 
5–10 were put into effect by the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Educa-
tion and Cultural Affairs in late 2003, leading ideas were introduced and both their 
main purpose as a new way of designating particular content areas and their stronger 
connection to contextually defined areas of phenomena were in large parts directly 
adopted from PISA. The set of leading ideas (number, measurement, space and shape, 
functional relationship, data and chance) bears both a close resemblance to the main 
ideas of Heymann and the big ideas of PISA. The introduction of standards and a 
national regime of assessment of these standards along with the specific understand-
ing of general education in mathematics (which again draws some inspiration from 
the understanding of mathematical literacy in PISA) has not been a frictionless pro-
cess and continues to draw some opposition. Yet, to my understanding, the leading 
ideas themselves have not been drawing much attention or criticism for that matter. 
We have to take into account that the main purpose of the educational standards is to 
“determine which competencies students should have acquired in a subject area by a 
certain grade” (KMK 2004, p. 3). Each leading idea (e.g. measurement), is therefore 
accompanied by a set of about ten discernible competencies (e.g. “students are able to 
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calculate the area and circumference of the rectangle, the triangle, the circle and com-
pounds of these figures” ibid. p. 10). While one can surely understand the calculation 
of the area of a circle as a problem of measurement, for the students to pass the test 
it is essential to correctly calculate the area, not to think about how this calculation is 
related to measurement in geometry or in general. If we would on the other hand e.g. 
require teachers to introduce the problem of the calculation of the area as a problem 
of measurement and to relate it to similar measurement problems and strategies stu-
dents have already met, we may be in line with the notion of orienting to fundamental 
ideas along the lines of the conceptions of the third phase. But educational standards 
are standards for outcome rather than standards for ways of teaching and learning, at 
least technically they do not justify such requirements.
Bluntly said, the little opposition main ideas have met may partly be attributed 
to the fact that the potential for innovation in orienting towards these main ideas is 
effectively rather small. The leading ideas mainly operate as designations for areas 
of contexts and contents. For that matter they bundle context and contents which 
are closely related to already well-established topics of mathematics instruction and 
which were already bundled and separated in similar ways according to the subdivi-
sion implied by more traditional content strands. Because the standards are first and 
foremost standards for assessment and evaluation, they also do not directly imply 
specific ways of arranging subject matter throughout individual processes of teaching 
and learning, as long as different processes meet the goals set by the standards in the 
end. The question whether using leading ideas for this limited objective is a sustain-
able use of this conception still remains. It could be argued that guidance by leading 
ideas is little more than lip service if it does not mean much more than acquiring a set 
of loosely grouped yet ultimately disbanded abilities and competencies.
Positively said, this more pragmatic account of fundamental ideas helped to reach 
some kind of consensus regarding a canon of ideas—at least at the level of the end 
of lower secondary education. This development had its particular prerequisites, as 
there are
(1) Shifting from fundamental ideas as rather general mathematical concepts, proce-
dures and activities themselves to fundamental ideas as different perspectives of 
the discipline on reality, closely related to already well-established central topics 
of school mathematics.
(2) Restricting the use of fundamental ideas to conceptualizing what matters in the 
end.
It will be interesting to observe whether this consensus remains intact regarding the 
newly introduced standards at the upper secondary level, where the same set of lead-
ing ideas is used but the partitions and priorities implied by leading ideas and tradi-
tional curricular strands differ more notably10.
10 For a first cautiously critical account see Wynands (2014).
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6  Fundamental Ideas and Subject Matter Didactics: Interrelations and 
Differentiations
This volume is dedicated to the specific tradition of subject matter didactics (“Stoff-
didaktik”) and there is little doubt that conceptions of fundamental ideas are deeply 
rooted within this tradition. One key issue of subject matter didactics is preparing 
mathematics for students. If one accepts that the benefits of analyzing the logi-
cal structure of the subject matter are limited for this purpose, achieving this goal 
involves a more elaborated process of “elementarization”. This is the process of 
translating “mathematical concepts, principles, techniques, and reasoning methods 
from the forms in which they are discovered and then verified by formal reasoning to 
forms that can be learned readily by a broad audience of students” (Fey 1994, p. 22).
One problematic feature processes of elementarization are prone to is that the 
principles and strategies involved in these processes often stay implicit. We are rather 
confronted with the results of elementarization processes than with the processes, 
principles and strategies that lead to them. The formulation of didactic principles 
can be seen as an attempt to elaborate on elementarization strategies and to justify 
them against the background of theories from educational psychology, philosophies 
of mathematics and education and other neighboring fields of research11. Guidance 
by fundamental ideas is one such principle. However, as may have become apparent 
already, different conceptions of fundamental ideas throughout the different stages of 
the development discussed above vary to a considerable extent regarding the explicit-
ness as well as the particular choice of background theories taken into account within 
these conceptions.
Embedding the discussion of fundamental ideas within subject matter didactics or 
relating both lines of research to each other faces another issue: To my understanding, 
subject matter didactics is less of a clear-cut research program with a mutually shared 
and explicitly stated theoretical basis, than more of a broader, theoretically somewhat 
heterogeneous approach mainly held together by focussing on the analysis of math-
ematical content for the purpose of preparing it for students. This approach has been 
the predominant approach in mathematics education research in German-speaking 
countries up until the 1970s12 and it has been heavily contested as being a reductionist 
approach since then (cf. Steinbring 2011).
The following section of this article offers two approaches for relating the discus-
sion about fundamental ideas with subject matter didactics. Firstly, I will choose 
Kirsch’s (1977/ 2000) reflections on “simplification” and making mathematics edu-
cation accessible for students as a starting point. In trying to answer what (potentially 
problematic) aspects of the German-language discussion about fundamental ideas 
may be associated with their background in subject matter didactics will then be 
broadened by integrating other accounts of subject matter didactics, some of them 
11 That is not to say that didactic principles do not have their own problematic features, for a critical 
account cf. Tietze (1994, pp. 43/44).
12 It is even sometimes argued that “Stoffdidaktik” is simply synonymous of “Mathematikdidaktik” (didac-




more critical towards this research approach in general. Secondly, I will compare fun-
damental ideas with “Grundvorstellungen”13, a second category deeply rooted within 
the subject matter didactics tradition. On the one hand, this category shares some 
of the objectives of fundamental ideas but on the other hand it has in many respects 
proven to be more open to an evolving understanding of the role of mathematical 
content knowledge in understanding and developing processes of mathematics teach-
ing and learning and may be a particularly interesting point of reference for our future 
understanding of fundamental ideas.
6.1  Relations to Subject Matter Didactics in General
Broadly speaking, one may define the main objective of subject matter didactics as 
trying to better understand mathematics in order to make it understandable and bet-
ter accessible for students. Kirsch (1977/2000) describes four ways in which subject 
matter didactics tries to make mathematics more accessible:
(1) by concentration on the mathematical heart of the matter,
(2) by including the “surroundings” of mathematics,
(3) by recognizing and activating pre-existing knowledge,
(4) by changing the mode of representation.
Of these four ways of making mathematics more accessible the first three are of par-
ticular interest for the development of fundamental ideas. Concentration on the math-
ematical heart of the matter is in its broadest sense the core objective of guidance by 
fundamental ideas, whereas fundamental ideas are in fact a possible conceptualiza-
tion of what constitutes the heart of all mathematics. Although, if we take Kirsch 
more literally, this statement has to be refined. Kirsch (1977/2000) defines making 
accessible by concentration on the mathematical heart of the matter as
the view, that mathematics in its most mature form, that is, mathematics in 
the narrowest sense of the word, stripped of all its genetic elements and con-
nections with reality, is the simplest mathematics. Working out the central 
concepts, generalizing, and emphasizing fundamental structures is a way of 
making mathematics more accessible.
While this view corresponds directly to early “New Math” interpretations of Bruner, 
neither the Meran reformists, nor Whitehead, nor the proponents of fundamental 
ideas in the third and fourth stage are solely (if at all) committed to this view. In fact, 
any of these conceptions places emphasis on either genetic elements or connections 
of mathematics to reality or both of those aspects (with Tietze, Klika & Wolpers 
demarking an extreme case by introducing a particular subcategory of fundamental 
ideas for basic concepts, genetic elements and connections to reality, respectively). 
However, we would be wronging Kirsch here if we would not take his further elabo-
ration on “the mathematical heart of the matter” into account. Kirsch argues that 
13 The term roughly translates to “basic notions” but will be kept German to ensure consistency across the 
articles in this volume.
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making accessible by concentrating on the heart of the matter cannot be achieved by 
“simplification of the deductive structure” alone, when in fact “structural simplifica-
tion can make access more difficult” (ibid., p. 270). Early approaches of implement-
ing fundamental ideas in the form of basic concepts and structures along the lines 
of the Bourbaki group may therefore be well intended but provide no royal road for 
making mathematics accessible to students according to Kirsch. Kirsch also con-
cedes that “what the essence of a concept is may be hard to decide” and one has to 
take into account “above and beyond internal mathematical considerations […] the 
pupils’ background knowledge”, notwithstanding the essence of a concept being “by 
no means merely a matter of taste” (ibid.).
The case of making accessible by including the “surroundings” of mathematics is 
a simpler one: Kirsch describes this way as “taking a broader view of mathematics—
which includes the origin of concepts and their relations to reality” (ibid., p. 271). Sch-
reiber is especially concerned with the origins of concepts within everyday thinking 
and we already mentioned Heymann’s assessment that conceptions of fundamental 
ideas widely agree upon their role as interfaces between mathematics and reality, this 
aspect even becoming the predominant one in the fourth phase of the development. 
Again, we may see early implementations of Bruner against the backdrop of “New 
Math” as the sole example where this aspect is widely neglected, although Bruner’s 
call for early intuitive use of fundamental ideas and discovery learning would have 
provided quite a good reason for thoroughly examining the origins of concepts.
Making mathematics more accessible by recognizing and activating pre-existing 
knowledge is closely related to the spiral curriculum. If one wants to introduce basic 
ideas in an intuitive form early on and then proceed by revisiting them and “build-
ing upon them until the student has grasped the full formal apparatus that goes with 
them” (Bruner 1977, p. 19), one clearly has to recognize and activate pre-existing 
knowledge at those later stages. All concepts of the third stage relate in some way to 
the notion of the spiral curriculum: it is less important in the case of leading ideas of 
the national educational standards, where assessment of the outcomes of educational 
processes begins to dominate designing these processes as the prevalent use case for 
these ideas.
As far as ways of making mathematics more accessible are concerned, guidance 
by fundamental ideas is therefore firmly rooted in the tradition of subject matter 
didactics. As subject matter didactics was well established before the notion of funda-
mental ideas became more common, it may provide one possible explanation for the 
large resonance this notion found in the German-speaking community of mathemat-
ics education research. Analyzing the mathematical content, working out its logical 
structure and uncovering the origins of its central concepts were tasks this tradition 
of mathematics education research had already grown accustomed to and it was as 
well needed in both identifying fundamental ideas and in conceiving ways they could 
guide mathematics instruction.
Unfortunately, research about fundamental ideas also shares some of the more 
problematic aspects this line of research is prone to in general. Traditionally, sub-
ject matter analyses have been concerned with the scientific elaboration of school-
mathematical subject areas, therefore creating “heteronomous background theories” 
(Becker 1978) which show that mathematical knowledge as taught in schools can—
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in principle—be arranged in a logically consistent way and built upon unambiguous 
foundations (cf. Sträßer 1994). Such an effort becomes problematic when the worked 
out background theories become the sole background against which didactical ques-
tions are answered (cf. Steinbring 2011, pp. 45/46). While proponents of subject mat-
ter didactics usually agree that their background theories are “meant for the teacher” 
and should not be “mistaken for proposed classroom material” (Kirsch 2000, p. 272), 
Vollrath (1979) argues that the intended relation between background theories and 
classroom material often is not outlined sufficiently precise within subject matter 
didactics either.
Steinbring (2011, p. 46) asserts that—at least in its “fundamentalist form” con-
ducted during the “New Math” period—subject matter didactics directly implied that 
the worked out background theories were “the central and crucial means […] for 
steering and optimizing mathematical instruction, learning and understanding”. He 
especially criticizes subject matter didactics for assuming that “mathematical knowl-
edge—as researched and developed in the academic discipline—is unchanged and 
absolute” therefore being “dominated by too simple a model to solve didactic ques-
tions and research problems” (ibid., p. 45). Following Winter (1985) and Freudenthal 
(1973) Steinbring argues that such an approach is reductionist in that it fails to appro-
priately take into account both the relation of mathematics to the “outer-mathematical 
reality” (Winter 1985, p. 81, translated by Steinbring 2011) and “mathematics as 
an activity” (Freudenthal 1973, p. 114). Steinbring himself is committed to a view 
of different cultures or (in his own words) “institutional systems” (Steinbring 2011, 
p. 51) of mathematics that are to some degree independent of each other. Mathemati-
cal knowledge within the mathematics classroom, mathematics in everyday practices 
and mathematics as a scientific discipline are such systems or cultures in each of 
which mathematical knowledge has to be constructed socially and which are there-
fore independent of each other to some extent. According to Steinbring any attempt 
to understand and/or influence one of these systems (e.g. the mathematical class-
room) has to be considered problematic if it does not take difference between these 
systems into account and simply tries to apply or superimpose the logic and inner 
workings from one of the other systems (e.g. mathematics as a scientific discipline). 
“New Math” can again be considered the prime example of such an undertaking, 
while subject matter didactics in general is at least prone to such a problematic view.
To what extent do these problems apply to different conceptions of fundamental 
ideas? I already mentioned that apart from early interpretations of Bruner against the 
background of “New Math” conceptions of fundamental ideas always include some 
considerations about the applications of mathematics, its roots in the realm of every-
day thinking and activity. Especially Schreiber’s conception conceptualizes funda-
mental ideas as a part of “mathematics as an activity”, i.e. it focuses on processes of 
mathematization rather than on concepts and structures of “ready-made mathemat-
ics” (Freudenthal 1973, p. 114). Vollrath’s and Steinbring’s critique may still apply 
to conceptions of fundamental ideas from the third stage in respect to their focus on 
rather conceptual considerations. Both Schreiber and Schweiger initially considered 
fundamental ideas primarily as meta-concepts for teachers and curriculum designers, 
elements of a background theory, whose actual consequences for curriculum design 
and classroom practice again are not outlined precisely sharp, let alone leading to sys-
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tematic empirical evaluation. Although background theories of the third stage of the 
development of fundamental ideas discussed above are not as rigorously constructed 
and restricted to the logical structure of mathematical knowledge as they were during 
the “New Math” phase, those conceptions still adhere to the notion of mathematics 
as a unified, continually developing activity, at its heart guided by the same ideas, 
whether one looks at mathematics in the classroom or at the “frontiers” of the sci-
entific discipline. While some considerations about different systems or cultures of 
mathematical practices to which different mathematical ideas may be central have 
been developing since the beginning of the second stage, the core assumption that 
there are some ideas central to any culture or system of mathematics at any level of 
its development simply must be maintained—otherwise, one would have to abandon 
any notion of fundamental ideas. As far as I can tell, Bruner’s “bold hypothesis” (“the 
intellectual activity is the same”) has not been rejected in this regard—yet little has 
been done to prove or disprove it on sound empirical grounds.
6.2  Relations to Grundvorstellungen
Grundvorstellungen (GV) as a second category deeply rooted within the subject mat-
ter didactics tradition, while sharing some of the objectives of fundamental ideas, 
have in many respects proven to be more open to an evolving understanding of the 
role of mathematical content knowledge in understanding and developing processes 
of mathematics teaching and learning.
GVs are “mathematical ideas” comparable to fundamental ideas to that effect that 
both of these constructs imply that there is a mathematical core, a gist of the matter, 
or literally: an idea one simply has to get, to understand what the related mathemati-
cal content is essentially about and to make appropriate use of it (cf. Vohns 2010). 
But GVs are local ideas, they try to make one particular concept, one particular oper-
ation or one particular method accessible through providing one or usually more than 
one model which then act together as different metaphorical approaches to the gist of 
this particular concept, operation or method, respectively. The main didactical objec-
tive of GVs has been and still is considered primarily to describe “adequate real-life 
contexts which represent the ‘heart’ (or ‘essence’) of the respective mathematical 
contents in a way which is understandable for the student” (vom Hofe 1998, p. 320), 
to make a mathematical concept applicable to real-world situations “by recognizing 
corresponding structures in real-life contexts or by modelling a real-life situation 
with the aid of the mathematical structure” (ibid.). One might even say that any con-
ception of mathematical learning that aims to provide any conceptual or procedural 
understanding at all (i.e. that is not solely committed to instrumental understanding) 
is to some effect concerned with GVs or a functional equivalent.
Fundamental ideas on the other hand have always been conceptualized as over-
arching meta-concepts that are meaningful for a broader area of mathematical con-
tent. They should be effective at different levels of mathematical activities, giving 
an understanding of the gist of the whole area of mathematical content in question 
or even mathematics in general. Every conception of fundamental ideas therefore 
draws attention to interconnections of mathematical knowledge. It brings forward 
what can be understood as the “common core” of a whole set of mathematical con-
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cepts, procedures and methods in this area and it rests on the assumption that to 
really understand mathematics—or better yet: to make it accessible to students as 
a teacher or curriculum designer—one has to recognize these interconnections and 
commonly shared features of the respective concepts, procedures and methods (cf. 
Vohns 2010). But that is an assumption that goes above and beyond the assumption 
that one particular concept or procedure has to be connected to corresponding con-
texts or structures in real life. It is also considerably more difficult to design empirical 
research that substantiates or disproves such assumptions, as they are not contained 
to a well-defined point within a learning process but rather assumptions about its 
long-term development.
Secondly, fundamental ideas, while often conceptualized as harking back to 
archetypes in everyday thinking and activities, and, often conceptualized as inter-
faces between mathematics and reality, have not been restricted to this particular 
aspect at least up until the fourth stage of the development as described above. The 
whole notion of “guidance by fundamental ideas”—as already mentioned a few times 
above—suffers from a relatively vague formulation of its exact didactical objective. 
Conceptions of GVs clearly assume that for a mathematical concept or procedure to 
be applicable to real-life situations students have to acquire appropriate GVs. The 
question is not whether they should acquire these models but rather which GVs have 
to be acquired and to what extent theoretically conceptualized, didactically intended 
GVs allow for individual adoptions and variations (cf. Vohns 2010, pp. 233–235). A 
similar certainty is not to be found in the context of fundamental ideas, where it is yet 
unclear which guidance should exactly be provided whom.
One possible way discussed to overcome the particular problems of fundamental 
ideas is linking research about fundamental ideas with research about GVs or similar 
notions of local ideas or subconcepts. For example, Kröpfl et al. (2000) discuss local 
meanings and central actions related to central ideas of stochastic. Local meanings 
act as functional equivalent of GVs to that effect that they are local embodiments of 
the central ideas which should give an idea of the meaning of a particular concept or 
procedure in real-life contexts. For example, the authors discuss replacing “an entire 
(often confusing) list of data by means of a single ‘representative’, ‘typical’ or ‘aver-
age’ value” (ibid., p. 35) as a local meaning of different measures of central tendency 
related to the central idea of data condensation.
For my own part, I have discussed ways of relating fundamental ideas and GVs 
and similar subconcepts in both Vohns (2005) and Vohns (2007) with a focus on arith-
metic and geometry and the fundamental ideas of number and measurement, respec-
tively. The approach suggested in these papers restricted the use of fundamental ideas 
to a rather analytical one, i.e. using fundamental ideas for identifying appropriate GVs 
and local subject-specific strategies students should (or do actually) achieve. Such an 
approach has the benefit of a rather clearly outlined didactical objective—students 
should acquire important GVs and local strategies. It might be considered deficient if 
one adheres to the notion of fundamental ideas as an important content to be learned 
in its own right. In Vohns (2010) I began to embrace a similar perspective, based 
upon the argument that for mathematics instruction to be relevant as background 
knowledge for students’ later lives a principle understanding of the inner workings 
of mathematics and the perspectives on reality it allows for has to be achieved that 
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goes beyond the mathematical procedures one is able to conduct by oneself. If one 
considers fundamental ideas relevant in this respect, strictly decomposing fundamen-
tal ideas to a set of GVs and local subject-specific strategies and afterwards just 
involving students with these local representations has to be considered insufficient. 
In Vohns (2010) it is therefore further argued that in addition to designing mathemati-
cal courses in a way that proposed fundamental ideas can be experienced by means 
of GVs and local subject-specific strategies, opportunities to discuss, negotiate and 
reflect on fundamental ideas themselves are as well needed, i.e. opportunities to think 
and talk about what is (or better yet: was in retrospect) central to a particular unit and 
how it relates to earlier mathematical experiences.
7  Outlook: Recent Developments and Closing Remarks
The present article was aimed at familiarizing the English-speaking reader with the 
discussion about and the development of fundamental ideas as a guiding category for 
mathematics education research. As far as the broader notion is concerned “that edu-
cation should not focus on subordinate matter, but on the central ideas of a discipline” 
(Bender and Schreiber 1980, p. 75) there is little doubt that this notion is mutually 
shared and will stay relevant for mathematics education.
The theoretical discussion about fundamental ideas as a didactical category has 
become less intense and few if any new attempts at conceptualizing fundamental 
ideas of mathematics as a whole have been undertaken since Heymann and the 
National Educational Standards for Mathematics in Grades 5–10. However, I con-
sider the discussion about central ideas of specific areas of mathematics a topic that 
is still important to mathematics education research. Leading ideas as designations 
of areas of phenomena in which mathematics is applicable still leave enough room 
to discuss why mathematics is applied in these areas and how it becomes useful in 
these areas. Yet, in answering these questions, central ideas of the respective areas 
inevitably become relevant.
More recent works on such central ideas include e.g. Biehler and Burrill (2011), 
who discuss how different perspectives on statistics and statistics teaching lead to 
different ideas “that seem to be fundamental for understanding and being able to use 
statistics in the workplace, in personal lives, and as citizens” (ibid., p. 57). Leuders et 
al. (2011) are interested in the role of core ideas of less broad areas of school math-
ematics for a design research program aimed at the lower secondary school years. 
In this approach the more objectivistic understanding of fundamental ideas is con-
fronted with the more subjective understanding of core ideas following the principle 
of dialogic learning (cf. Gallin 2012).
The idea of more personal, individualized accounts of fundamental ideas has also 
grown on Schweiger (2005, 2010), who claims that “the most important point is that 
student teachers, teachers, and teacher educators consider the possibility of finding 
such fundamental ideas. This process clearly should involve a communicative struc-
ture and could take place in seminars, during in-service education, and very important 
during casual discussions” (Schweiger 2005, p. 71). In Vohns (2010) it is suggested 
to consider proposed fundamental ideas opportunities to experience coherence and 
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continuity, which students should negotiate about and which have to be thought of as 
an offer they actually can refuse on grounds of reflection upon their own experience 
of socially constructing mathematical knowledge in the classroom.
ABCmath (cf. Kuntze et al. 2011; Kuntze and Dreher 2011) was a trinational proj-
ect for raising “awareness of big ideas in mathematics” which again chose a middle 
ground between more general fundamental ideas and strictly local conceptions such 
as GVs. The unique qualities within this approach towards “awareness for big ideas” 
are that the approach both aims directly at designing learning opportunities foster-
ing reflection on big ideas for students as well as prospective or active teachers of 
mathematics and that the “big ideas” considered lay great emphasis on establishing 
networks between mathematical topics from different mathematical content strands. 
Kuntze and Dreher (2011, p. 16) also contains the notion of fundamental ideas of 
mathematics education (i.e. pedagogical content knowledge) for teachers. Simi-
larly, Rezat (2012) suggests fundamental ideas of mathematics education as a way 
of reflection on theories in mathematics education research, Rezat et al. (2014) fur-
ther explore this idea choosing “transformation” as an idea considered fundamental 
within mathematics education research.
The diversification of approaches to identify and conceptualize the didacti-
cal objectives of fundamental ideas currently pursued might be considered a much 
needed countermeasure against the one-sidedness of simply trying to superimpose 
basic ideas, concepts and structures of the scientific discipline upon mathematics 
instruction. The ongoing trend towards less “big”, less general ideas (that is to fun-
damental ideas that only cover specific content areas or specific ideas for networking 
different areas well coverable within a single teaching unit) is without a doubt helpful 
in more clearly working out teaching examples and in carrying out empirical studies 
e.g. in design research settings. On the other hand, such ideas suffer inevitably from 
the problem that either the amount of fundamental ideas becomes rather large or 
otherwise, if only a few ideas are chosen (e.g. for the matter of making at least some 
interconnections between different areas of mathematical content tangible) the result-
ing sets sometimes convey a rather eclectic impression.
Therefore, the question still remains, whether mathematics instruction should 
also aim at “larger” ideas, which try to provide students with an understanding of 
the “nature of mathematics” (cf. Müller-Hill 2015)—and how such a goal can be 
achieved. Questions about the nature of mathematics (and questions about the ends 
to which we teach mathematics in school) will always remain normative questions 
because the answers we may find will always depend on which perception of math-
ematics we deem adequate as far as school mathematics is concerned. As long as we 
consider fundamental ideas related to and helpful in answering these questions, the 
discussion about fundamental ideas will remain relevant to mathematics education.
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